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Cornelis de Waal1
47 Against Preposterous Philosophies
of Mind
[Some] imagine that an idea has to be connected with a brain, or has to inhere in a “soul”.
This is preposterous: the idea does not belong to the soul; it is the soul that belongs to the
idea. The soul does for the idea just what the cellulose does for the Beauty of the rose; that
is to say, it aﬀords its opportunity. (EPII: 122, 1902).
The remark is found in the second chapter of Peirce’s Minute Logic, “On Science
and Natural Classes”. There Peirce explains that his classiﬁcation of the sciences
is not an artiﬁcial one, conceived in aprioristic fashion, but a living or natural
classiﬁcation, resembling rather the biologist’s classiﬁcation of species. In this
context Peirce brings up the relation between ideas and the soul to counter
those who say that we ﬁrst need to know the workings of the human psyche
before we can properly classify the things we claim to know. This is the same
objection that Peirce makes against psychologism in logic. Peirce’s remark,
however, reaches far beyond that of a proper classiﬁcation of the sciences. It
captures a view of the mind that runs counter to the tradition in a most radical
way. The remark is not an isolated comment either. For instance, more than
three decades earlier Peirce illustrated his view by writing: “just as we say that
a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we
are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us” (W2: 227n).
I particularly like the quotation because it encapsulates a concise frontal
attack on the modern conception of the mind as it is shaped by, and after,
Descartes – a conception that is still very much alive even today. In fact, it
addresses not only the original dualistic interpretation – with its radical separa-
tion of mind and body – but also its monistic oﬀspring, such as the mind-brain
identity theory.Whether we adhere to a dualistic or a monistic account, the basic
notion remains the same: our thoughts are believed to spring from some inner
source. Not without cynicism, Peirce observes that though Descartes’s idea of a
pineal gland is routinely ridiculed, “everybody continues to think of mind in
this same general way, as something within this person or that, belonging to
him and correlative to the real world” (CP 5.128). This modern conception is
further reinforced and intertwined with the modern conception of man as an
autonomous individual who enters society by choice and preformed. Our inter-
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action with others does not shape our mind; it merely gives it content. In the
short space allotted I will say something about this attack on the modern con-
ception of mind and the inspiring alternative it opens up.
In the quotation, Peirce calls the belief that ideas inhere in a soul pre-
posterous. The Century Dictionary, to which Peirce amply contributed, deﬁnes
preposterous as “having that last which ought to be ﬁrst”, referring to the word’s
origin as the combination of præ and posterus, the Latin for “before” and “com-
ing after” (CD: 4697). Though over time the word accrued other meanings, Peirce’s
ethics of terminology suggests he might stick to the original one. In more recent
times, Jacques Barzun has been talking of the fallacy of preposterism. By this he
means the fallacy of “seeking to obtain straight oﬀ what can only be the fruit of
some eﬀort, putting an end before the beginning”.2 Susan Haack has drawn this
fallacy more directly into the moral realm, stating that preposterism causes
sham reasoning: One is not genuinely interested in what is true, but begins by
expostulating what one wants to be true and then uses inquiry to ﬁnd one’s
support for it – and we all know that it is much easier to convince someone of
what he already believes than to convince someone of something he does not
believe, or has not yet formed an opinion about.3 The generally held belief that
we have a soul, or mind, is a prime example of something that has been found
important enough to invite preposterism. Historically, the reasons why we have
ascribed a soul to ourselves have varied greatly. To name but a few, we have
brought in the notion of a soul as a plausible explanation for how we think,
feel, and put our body in motion; as a way to develop a meaningful theory about
life after death; as an anchor for theories that rely on the concept of autonomous
moral agents; and as the foundation for an epistemology that sought to ground
all knowledge in the knowing individual – Descartes’s famous ego cogito. It
would not be incorrect to say that typically we start with a notion of the soul
that for whatever reason we know has to be true – that is unquestionably true –
and then proceed to show that reality conforms to it. We know what we are
looking for, and thus we ﬁnd it.
If instead we want to put ﬁrst things ﬁrst, where do we begin? Taking Peirce’s
quotation as our guide, we should ﬁrst explore these so-called ideas. When we
reﬂect upon our thought, it is ideas that we perceive. Hence, to put the soul, or
the mind, or the brain ahead of ideas is preposterous. The ideas come ﬁrst and
the soul, mind, or brain, as an explanation for the presence of these ideas and
their interconnections, comes after. A familiar way of talking about ideas is
2 Michael Murray (ed.). 2002. The Jacques Barzun Reader. New York: Harper Collins. 398.
3 Susan Haack. 1997. Science, Scientism, and Anti-Science in the Age of Preposterism. Sceptical
Inquirer 21(6).
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Locke’s. Locke uses the term to stand for “whatsoever is the Object of the Under-
standing when a Man thinks”.4 Peirce is in broad agreement with this (CP 1.285),
though he objects that Locke and his fellow empiricists are preposterous about
ideas. Their conception of ideas comes already pre-loaded with lots of meta-
physics. Instead, Peirce develops what he calls phaneroscopy, which studies
not ideas but the phaneron as it immediately presents itself independently of
any act of the understanding, including those acts that shaped the empiricists’
notion of ideas. With the phaneron Peirce means “the collective total of all that
is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether
it corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP 1.284). Connecting it all back to
Peirce’s classiﬁcation of the sciences, phaneroscopy is, for Peirce, the most basic
of the positive sciences.
Hence, putting ﬁrst things ﬁrst, it is with phaneroscopy that we must begin,
not with a Cartesian ego cogito, or with the need for some medium that can
satisfy our desire for immortality or onto which to paste our personhood. Making
what he takes to be minimal assumptions about the phaneron, and with the
help of a branch of mathematics that is virtually presuppositionless (topology),
Peirce extracts from the phaneron three categories that are present in anything we
can possibly think of: ﬁrstness (the pure quality of being what it is, positively, and
independently of anything else), secondness (the unmediated opposition of a
ﬁrst to something it is not), and thirdness (a positive relation between two ﬁrsts
that are second to each other).5 Suppose that after a long day of travel the next
morning you wake up, slowly, in a strange bed. When in that brief moment
between sleep and wakefulness you become dimly aware of a general presence,
you are close to experiencing pure ﬁrstness. When you subsequently become
dimly aware also of yourself as being there, an element of secondness enters as
what you ﬁrst experienced is now second to you. This is close to an experience
of pure secondness, as the two are still unrelated.When you subsequently recall
the travels of the previous day, thirdness emerges, as a positive relation is being
established between you and the room. Here, I think, we see the root of our
notion of a soul, or a mind, or a self, etc. as a yet undeﬁned (phaneroscopic)
opposition that can be ﬂeshed out at the level of thirdness.
First, though, we need to take a step back and ask how anything can be
lifted out of this phaneron to begin with. Peirce ﬁnds the answer in normative
science. Normative science studies the phaneron insofar as it conforms to certain
4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), I.i.8.
5 For a brief account, see Cornelis de Waal, Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Blooms-
bury, 2013), chapter 3.
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ends. Hence, it says that certain things can be lifted out of the phaneron by
exploring motives. As is well known, Peirce divides normative science into
esthetics, ethics, and logic. In the esthetic mood we extract from the phaneron
something that imparts a positive simple immediate quality of totality (CP 5.132);
esthetics aims to identify what is “objectively admirable without any ulterior
reason” (CP 1.191). Peirce next distinguishes ethics, which studies the conformity
of action to something admirable. Finally, logic studies a particular type of
action, called reasoning, in relationship to its end, which is truth, or the correct
representation in thought of how things are. Normative science thus allows us to
extract from the phaneron ideas, like “the earth revolves around the sun”, “there
is a ship at the horizon”, and “we have a soul”, some of which are true and
others not.
How does this all relate to our notion of a soul or mind? In the late 1860s,
Peirce addresses the issue as follows (W2: 202): Though at birth the child is con-
scious, he does not yet have what Peirce calls a self. The latter is acquired in the
interaction with others and with the environment more generally. Peirce gives
the example of a mother who warns her child that the stove is hot. The child –
whose experience with hot and cold is restricted to what he immediately feels –
disbelieves what he hears because the stove does not feel hot to him. It is only
upon touching the stove that the child discovers that his mother’s testimony was
a better sign of truth than his own experience. Hence, the child becomes aware
of error and ignorance, and in eﬀect he responds to it by positing, not deliberately
but as a matter of course, something like a self, mind, or soul, in which those
errors and his ignorance can inhere. Our initial notion of the self thus emerges
from our experience of opposition – from things being diﬀerent than we think
them to be. In attempting to get a better understanding of this predicament,
various questions can be asked. Is this hypothesis of a single self not premature?
Why not say that the various experiences of discord lead to a multiplicity of
selves? If there is a single self, what constitutes its unity? Can we somehow
gain direct access to its innards? How does self relate to consciousness? Is there
more to self than an accumulation of error and ignorance – of our idiosyncrasies,
of our not ﬁtting in? Etc.
Given how the self enters the scene, the most obvious answer is that we
come to know it through a prolonged interaction with it. This is pretty much
how we come to know anything. Questions like the unity of the self, or its
persistence through time, could also ﬁnd an answer this way – we come to
know it like we come to know the unity or persistence of everything else that
enters our experience, whether grapefruits or train stations, namely through
our interactions with it. Some have argued that we have an immediate access
to the self because we are conscious of it. Peirce, however, sees serious problems
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with identifying our mind or self with our consciousness of it. Though our nervous
system happens to exhibit both the phenomenon of consciousness and that of
mind, this does not prove them identical, and the discovery of unconscious
mind is a clear strike against it (CP 7.364). Peirce sees the relation as follows:
When we are conscious of something – for instance, that rose bushes have sharp
thorns – this is merely the inward aspect of what is essentially an outward fact.
And it would be a mistake to confuse the former for the latter, or to simply
assume them equivalent. Peirce argues further that how we are conscious of
our own thoughts is not in any essential way diﬀerent from how we are con-
scious of common facts, like seeing a tree down the road, hearing a train cross
a bridge, or smelling that the toast is burnt.
Peirce’s response lies in his semeiotics. We appear to ourselves – as every-
thing appear to us – as a sign, that is, as something that stands for something
else in some respect. Every perception, including the products of what is com-
monly called introspection, is an interpretation of something (i.e., a sign) that
is made determinate by something it is not (the object the sign is a sign of). We
do seem to have immediate experiences, say, when we experience an unex-
pected blow against the head, but that is merely a limiting case. What makes it
immediate is not some direct insight, but that it is not (yet) determined by some-
thing it is not – say the stray baseball that was responsible for it. All meaningful
perception is mediated; it is the result of an abduction, conscious or unconscious,
in which it appears as a plausible hypothesis – that is, as something worthy of
being lifted from the phaneron. This is true also for our experience of self.
It next becomes our task to ﬂesh out this hypothesis, and to do so independ-
ently of anything else we want our selves to be. Because space is limited, I can
only give the very beginnings of a brief sketch. Since we appear to ourselves as
an (admittedly complex) sign, we appear to ourselves as second. The result is a
duality that manifests itself as an inner dialogue wherein we constantly chase
our own tale without ever catching up: we endlessly replace our self with a
new interpretation of our self. The sign that we are to ourselves is thus always
a sign external to the new self that is being generated in the interpretation of
our old self, and which itself emerges as a sign to be interpreted. Seen this
way, there is no essential diﬀerence between my being in dialogue with my self
(or myself) and my being in dialogue with some other self. The issue is merely
one of access. In the dialogue we carry on with our self we have accustomed
ourselves to suppressing our vocal cords, thus creating a silent conversation
that only we can hear. Moreover, through our memory we have access to infor-
mation, however dubious at times, that others have not. These diﬀerences, how-
ever, are inconsequential. There are inaudible dialogues between others as well,
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and there is a great variety of sources of information, all with their own restric-
tions on who can access them and when.
Our discussion shows that the conversation with one’s self is derivative.
We are not born talking to ourselves but only acquire this trait by having ﬁrst
conversed with others. Hence, in our exploration we should begin with the com-
munal mind, the mind that we come to partake in after birth, as it is from this
that our so-called individual minds, or souls, are subsequently distilled. It is the
ideas that shape our self, not our self that shapes our ideas; we learn to speak
about ourselves by being spoken to, sometimes with disastrous consequences.
Earlier we saw that we begin to attribute a mind, self, or soul, to ourselves (the
terms vary) when we come to realize that sometimes there is a discrepancy
between what we think and how things are. This consciousness then comes to
suggest what belongs to this mind and what does not. We realized, however,
that this rests upon us confusing the thought, or the idea, with our being con-
scious of that thought. This being conscious of the thought is merely its inward
aspect – something that accrues to the idea without belonging to its essence.
Put in semeiotic terms, albeit not Peirce’s, it is part of the sign vehicle without
being part of the sign proper. Take a weathervane that signals the direction of
the wind. This weathervane has many elements that enable it to act as a sign –
aﬀord it its opportunity as Peirce has it. These elements, however, are not essen-
tial to the weathervane acting as a sign because they could have been very
diﬀerent – the weathervane could have been made of diﬀerent material, have a
diﬀerent colour, shape, size, etc. Thus, if my thinking that the earth revolves
around the sun constitutes a sign (because at that moment this is how I appear
to myself), my being conscious of it has the same relationship to the thought as
the chicken on a weathervane has to the direction of the wind. It is part of the
vehicle that enables that particular sign action to occur without being essential
to it. One and the same thought-sign – say that the earth revolves around the
sun – an reside in anything that enables it to act as that sign. Though this surely
includes individual human consciousness, it is certainly not limited to it. It can
be written in a book, carved in stone, painted on canvas, or displayed with a
Java app on a website. In fact, Peirce is keen to observe that it makes far more
sense to say that an author’s thought resides in his books, of which countless
copies are printed, than in his brain. In determining its meaning it is not the
intention of the author that counts, nor the consciousness that generated or
accompanied the thought, but the interpretation by others, including the author’s
future self, and this is a result of the sign action of the thought on paper. Once
the book is printed, the author too becomes a reader.
Now what can we say of the unity of the self or rather, of ourselves, or of
its persistence through time? I believe that I am the teenager that played rugby
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at eighteen, the journalist that covered the fall of the Berlin Wall in his late
twenties, the philosopher that wrote a book on Peirce, etc. One way of stating
this is that all those moments belong to one and the same person. If the self is
how we appear to ourselves, then we can look at personhood as a consistent
thread through a multiplicity of selves – both synchronic and diachronic –
which together constitute a sign that elicits interpretation. We can even look at
the body, with all its changes and transformations, as its sign vehicle. Note,
though, that such personhood is not an isolated, internal aﬀair. It is a public
aﬀair, even though for much of it I am the only witness; it includes what others
say or think about me, even without my knowing it. Given what is said, it is not
necessary that everything that forms a consistent thread through a multiplicity
of selves, and would thus be a person, be all connected to a single body or
follow a single temporal train. A football team, and even a book or a theory,
could be a person. The term might apply even to a bulky report on global warm-
ing written perhaps by a hundred experts of whom none has a clear picture of
the issue at hand or of all that the text in a broad sense entails.6
All of this at best hints at some most rudimentary beginnings of a criticism
of the traditional conceptions of consciousness, mind, soul, self, person, etc.,
with its semeiotic alternative – both suggested by Peirce’s writings and inspired
by the above quotation.
6 For a fuller discussion see Cornelis de Waal’s Science Beyond the Self: Remarks on Charles S.
Peirce’s Social Epistemology. Cognitio: Revista de Filosoﬁa 7.1 (2006): 149–63.
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